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We examine the impact of renminbi revaluation on firm valuations, considering two surprise
announcements of changes in China’s exchange rate policy in 2005 and 2010 and data on 6,050
firms in 44 countries.  Renminbi appreciation has a positive effect on firms exporting to China but
little positive or even a negative impact on those providing inputs for China’s processing exports.
Stock prices rise for firms competing with China in their home market while falling for firms importing
Chinese products with large imported-input content. Renminbi appreciation also reduces the valuation
of financially-constrained firms, particularly in more financially integrated countries.
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I.  Introduction 
The effects of China’s exchange rate are a prominent topic in both policy debate and 
analytical discussion.  In policy circles, the questions include whether China should allow its 
currency to appreciate to encourage global rebalancing – that is, to shift the composition of 
activity away from exports and facilitate the efforts of deficit countries like the United States to 
export more.
1  They include whether a change in Chinese currency policy would have a 
significant impact on U.S. output and employment.
2   
In analytical discussions, the questions include how a change in Chinese exchange rate 
policy would affect different sectors and activities in other countries.  China exports a wide range 
of final goods.  Foreign firms competing with Chinese exporters of these products should 
therefore feel positive effects from a change in policy that signals greater Chinese willingness to 
allow the renminbi to rise.  Similarly, China is increasingly important as a source of parts and 
components for manufacturing in other countries.  Firms relying on these inputs will therefore be 
adversely affected by renminbi appreciation that makes those inputs more expensive.  Some 
investigators focusing on the United States conclude that this channel has grown to the point 
where the impact of renminbi appreciation on U.S. firms would be negative on balance.
3    
Foreign producers exporting final goods to China, for their part, would benefit from 
renminbi appreciation that increases the purchasing power of Chinese firms and households.  
Insofar as currency appreciation is accompanied by other measures designed to stimulate 
domestic spending, the benefit to countries exporting final goods to China would be greater still. 
                                                 
1 For competing perspectives, see Eichengreen (2007), Dooley et al. (2009), Hanson and Robertson (2010), and 
Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti (2011).  
2 For competing perspectives see Scott (2010) and Evenett and Francois (2010). 




China is also a source of demand for parts and components produced in Asia and elsewhere.
4  
While renminbi appreciation would increase China’s command over these products, it could also 
signal a shift away from the export-oriented assembly operations that have been a source of this 
demand.
5  
Finally, China is an important purchaser of foreign assets and influence on foreign 
financial conditions.  Its purchases of U.S. treasury securities are a concomitant of its exchange 
rate regime; they are required to prevent the renminbi from rising more rapidly against the dollar.  
Greater willingness to allow the renminbi to rise might imply fewer Chinese purchases and, in 
turn, higher foreign yields (e.g. Bernanke 2005, Bernanke et al 2011).  This could affect the cost 
of funding for foreign corporations insofar as that cost is linked to conditions in treasury markets.  
Foreign firms depending most on external finance would presumably be hit hardest.   
These effects could then be tempered or reinforced by the foreign response to changes in 
China’s currency policy.  Indications that China is prepared to allow its currency to appreciate 
would reduce the risk of trade sanctions by countries that have strongly advocated renminbi 
revaluation, positively affecting foreign firms that benefit from trade with the country.  The 
currencies of other emerging markets might appreciate along with the renminbi, something that 
would have further implications for foreign firms and their competitors.
6 
                                                 
4 Based on Chinese trade statistics, 45.7 per cent of China’s imports in 2006 were used for so-called processing 
exports (35.7 per cent being intermediate inputs and 10 per cent being capital-goods imports). 
5 Garcia-Herrero and Koivu (2009) estimate that a ten per cent rise in the renminbi would reduce China’s imports of 
components by as much as 6 per cent.  Ahmed (2009) also find that renminbi appreciation could cause both China’s 
processing and non-processing exports to go down, by examining the latest data till 2009. His finding reinforces the 
conclusions of some earlier studies, such as Marquez and Schindler (2006), which found that Chinese exports 
respond strongly to movements in the real exchange rate.  
6 It is worth mentioning that we focus on the exchange rate angle. As the currency may be only one part of the 
global rebalancing, our exercise is therefore narrowly defined and examining just one piece of the global 




In this paper we test for the importance of these channels through which a change in 
Chinese exchange rate policy can impact firms in other countries.  We ask how announcements 
by the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) on July 21
st, 2005 and June 19
th, 2010, both of which 
created expectations of currency appreciation, affected the market valuation of foreign firms.  
These two events were driven more by political factors than concurrent macroeconomic news in 
China, with the timing and extent being a surprise to the market.
7  This provides us with a way of 
dealing with the endogeneity problem that plagues studies of the impact of exchange-rate 
announcements on financial variables. 
Since we have only two PBOC announcements, we also consider a set of politically-
driven changes in prospective Chinese exchange rate policy as perceived by the markets.  We 
identify large movements in renminbi non-deliverable forward contracts and use media coverage 
to distinguish movements driven by political factors rather than macroeconomic news.  Using 
this approach we identify four instances where there were expectations of politically-driven 
changes in China’s exchange rate.  
By focusing on these politically-driven events, we aim to address a basic challenge in the 
empirical literature on exchange rates, i.e., the difficulty of separating the impact of exchange 
rate changes on other macroeconomic variables from causality running in the opposite direction.  
As Engel (2009) writes of the exchange-rate-trade-balance nexus, “…it is very difficult to assess 
the effect of exchange rates on trade balances. There are few if any cases of “exogenous” 
changes in the exchange rate…Instead, any comovements between exchange rates and trade 
quantities are confounded by the forces that cause the exchange rate to change in the first 
                                                 
7At the time of both announcements, there was little indication of inflation accelerating to unacceptably high levels 
or of irrational exuberance in asset markets.  In the second case, Chinese inflation did eventually accelerate, but 




place…But then it is hard econometrically to separate out the effect of the depreciation on the 
trade balance and the effect of the trade balance on the depreciation.”
8  To the extent that the 
PBOC announcements and NDF movements we consider reflect political rather than economic 
factors, this problem of reverse causality will not be as serious as in other contexts.  
Firm-level data permit us to distinguish different channels through which Chinese 
currency policy affects other countries.  We can distinguish firms that compete with Chinese 
exports of similar products from firms that export directly to China.  We can distinguish 
exporters of parts and components from exporters of final goods.  We can distinguish foreign 
firms according to their degree of dependence on external finance.   
We find that the stock returns of non-Chinese corporations rise in response to 
expectations of renminbi appreciation.  This response appears to be associated with general 
market sentiment, which we interpret in terms of reduced risk of trade-policy conflict, as well as 
with specific trade effects.  There are, at the same time, pronounced differences across firms.  A 
large positive effect is evident for exporters of final goods to China.  Suppliers of inputs for 
China’s processing exports, in contrast, experience no significant net market-valuation effects at 
the time of the two PBOC announcements.
9 
 We find similar patterns when examining the implications of Chinese currency policy for 
competition in the firm’s home markets.  Firms competing with China in home markets in selling 
                                                 
8 Earlier studies have examined how exchange rates affect equity prices (see for example Phylaktis and Ravazzolo 
2005). Effects for individual firms vary in the expected way according to exposure to exchange rates (firm size, 
multinational status, foreign sales, international assets, competitiveness and so forth; see Bartov and Bodnar (1994), 
He and Ng (1998), Griffin and Stulz (2001), Williamson (2001), Bodnar, Dumas and Marston (2002), Dominguez 
and Tesar (2006), Parsley and Popper (2006), and Bartram, Brown, and Minton (2010) ).   
9 Possibly, the positive income effect of renminbi appreciation is offset by the negative effect from reduced derived 
demand for processing inputs.  Other recent work also finds a negative long-term impact of renminbi appreciation 
on China’s imports, plausibly reflecting this imported-input effect. For example Marquez and Schindler (2006), and 
Cheung, Chinn and Fujii (2010), using aggregate country-level data, find that Chinese ordinary imports rise in 




final products face less competition from China after renminbi appreciation; their share prices 
benefit correspondingly. In contrast, there is little evidence of analogous benefits for firms 
competing in their home market with China in processing trade.  Firms competing with China in 
third markets also face less competition, and their share prices rise accordingly.  Finally, there is 
some support for the view that announcements of changes in Chinese currency policy, by 
causing investors to revise upward their estimates of actual and expected treasury yields, reduce 
the market valuation of firms that depend on external finance for funding their investment.    
These patterns are still evident when we control for firm-specific characteristics and 
sector, year and country fixed effects. They carry over when we control for local currency 
movements at the time of renminbi appreciation. They hold whether total stock returns or 
abnormal returns are used as the dependent variable.  Placebo tests for similar effects on 
adjoining days do not find them, suggesting that these effects are not being caused by other 
events affecting market valuations.  Finally, most these patterns continue to hold when we 
expand our sample to four dates of market expectations of politically-motivated changes in 
renminbi policy. 
 We describe our data and methodology in Section II. Section III presents results for the 
two PBOC announcements. Section IV reports robustness checks, while Section V extends the 
sample to four dates when there were market expectations of politically-motivated changes in 




II.    Data and Methodology 
Our basic specification is of the form:  
 
  ijkt jkt jkt ijkt ijkt StockReturn TradeChannels FinancialChannel Controls         (1)    
 
Here “Stock Return” is the one-day return for firm i in sector j in country k at time t.  “Trade 
Channel” encompasses three trade-related effects of China’s exchange rate announcements: the 
impact on exports to China, the impact on imports from China, and the impact on competition 
with China in third markets.  Trade data are collected from the UN Comtrade data set, which 
provides information on bilateral imports and exports for each country pair at the 4-digit US SIC 
level.   
The problem of reverse causality running from stock prices to exchange rate policy 
should not be as serious here as in other studies of the relationship between exchange rates and 
related variables, since our stock price variable is highly disaggregated while the exchange rate is 
a macroeconomic variable.  That is to say, movements in individual share prices are unlikely to 
affect an economy-wide aggregate like the exchange rate.  Nonetheless, to further address the 
possibility of reverse causality, we lag the trade data, using 2004 observations for the 2005 
announcement and 2008 observations for the 2010 announcement.
10  We also focus on episodes 
where expectations of changes in the exchange rate arise from political as opposed to economic 
developments, as explained below. 
In practice we distinguish the importance for these various classes of firms of (a) China’s 
own market, as captured by exports to China by sector j of country k divided by global exports of 
                                                 




sector j of country k, (b) the impact on home-market competition, as captured by imports from 
China by sector j in country k divided by total imports of sector j in country k, and (c) Chinese 
competition in third markets.
11  We  construct the third-market competition index as follows: i) 
For a third-market  in a given year, say the U.S. in 2004, we first calculate its importance to an 
exporter, say the steel industry in Korea, as Korean steel exports to the U.S. divided by Korean 
aggregate steel exports; ii) We then calculate the share of China’s steel products in the U.S. steel 
market, measured as China’s steel exports to the U.S. divided by total U.S. steel imports;  iii) We 
multiply the US  importance to the Korean exporter (from i)  and the share of China’s product in 
the U.S. (from ii), and sum the result over all importing countries (across the U.S., Euro area, 
Japan, etc…)  to derive the third-market competition  index faced by Korean steel industry. 








            
(2)      
 
All measures of trade channels vary across country, sector and year and hence still allow 
us to include fixed effects for countries, sectors and years.  
We compute stock returns as follows.  For the July 21
st, 2005 announcement (Thursday, 
4pm Shanghai time), we take the log change in the closing price between July 21
th and July 22
nd 
for Asian firms.  For firms in other countries we take the log difference in the closing price 
between July 20
th and July 21
st so as to control for time-zone effects.  For the June 19
th, 2010 
                                                 
11 The second and third of these variables are constructed following Forbes (2004).  For sectors with no export data, 




announcement, which occurred on a Saturday, we take the log difference between closing prices 
on June 18
th and 21
st.  Stock prices are from Datastream.
12 
Table I shows the number of listed manufacturing firms by country.  We consider all 
countries other than China for which data on at least four firms are available (44 economies in 
all).  
Table II shows market returns and exchange rate movements around these two 
announcements. Three fourths of our sample countries experienced a rise in stock prices with an 
average stock market return of 0.6% and a standard deviation of 1.1%. Interestingly, the U.S. 
stock market return is negative around the time of both announcements (-0.69% in 2005, and -
0.39% in 2010). Whether these heterogeneous responses are due to idiosyncratic shocks or 
systematic factors is to be determined. 
Some currencies, particularly in Asia, appreciated together with the renminbi around the 
time of the two announcements (again see Table II). This suggests another channel through 
which renminbi announcements can affect foreign stock markets: by affecting other exchange 
rates.
13   
 Figure 1 juxtaposes stock market returns and trade with China for different countries. 
The top two charts consider exports to China over total exports around the time of the two PBOC 
announcements.  It is hard to detect a significant association between the stock market reaction 
and total exports to China. The bottom two charts consider imports from China over total 
imports, again for the two PBOC announcements. Again it is hard to discern a simple 
correlation.
14   
                                                 
12 In robustness checks, we will also study abnormal stock market returns (see below). 
13 We will consider this as well in the analysis. 




However, the absence of a correlation could result from the presence of different factors 
working in opposite directions and affecting different firms differentially.  While foreign firms 
exporting final products to China should benefit from the additional demand that comes with 
appreciation, foreign firms exporting components to China for processing trade could suffer due 
to the decline in demand for China’s final exports. Similarly, firms relying Chinese products as 
inputs into their own production, including the parent companies of Chinese subsidiaries and 
other upstream companies that are part of the same global supply chain, may find their costs 
increased by renminbi appreciation.  





Trade Channels ( China's Processing Imports )*(Exports to China )
( China's Processing Exports )*(Imports from China )









 n) jkt            
(3) 
 
where we expect that  12 0   . That is, firms supplying inputs to China for that country’s 
processing trade will experience stock-price declines.  We similarly expect  22 0   , since  firms 
importing inputs from China will experience higher costs as well.
15  
  Data for China’s processing trade are from Koopman, Wang and Wei (2008), who use the 
UN BEC classification and processing-trade information from China Customs Trade Statistics to 
identify the use for imports of some 100 sectors in China for the year of 2002.
16   The authors 
                                                 
15 A large literature considers the location and magnitude of processing trade (e.g., Feenstra and Hanson (2005)). In 
this paper we focus not on questions of location and magnitude but on how the exchange rate shock affects firm 
valuation given the pattern of processing trade.    
16 China’s Customs Trade Statistics classifies imports to China as for processing trade or for normal usage. 
Koopman et al.  (2008) report the classifications for two years of 1997 and 2002. We use the later as it is closer to 




estimate the shares of intermediates for processing exports, intermediates for normal use, capital 
goods for normal use, capital goods for processing exports, and final consumption goods. To 
calculate  j China's Processing Imports  for sector j, we sum over the share of intermediates for 
processing exports and the share of capital goods for processing exports. The resulting variable 
ranges from 0.02 to 0.85, with a mean of 0.43 and a median of 0.48.
17  Koopman, Wang and Wei 
(2008) use China’s 2002 input-output table to calculate the percentage of direct foreign value-
added in China’s exports, by industry. Following their example, we use this percentage as a 
proxy for the comparable variable on the export side,  j China's Processing Exports .  This ranges 
from 0 to 0.99, with a mean of 0.37 and a median of 0.40.
18  
The variable “Financial Channel” is designed to capture the impact of renminbi 
appreciation expectations on corporate funding costs, for firms that depend on external finance in 
particular, insofar as renminbi appreciation is expected to imply reduced Chinese purchases of 
U.S. treasury securities and put upward pressure on yields generally.  We construct a sector-level 
approximation of a firm’s intrinsic dependence on external finance for capital investment 
following the methodology of Rajan and Zingales (1998): 
 
capital expenditures - cash flow
Dependence on external finance for investment = 
capital expenditures                  
(4)
          
 
 
                                                 
17 Sectors with large share of imports for processing exports include, for example electronic element and device, and 
plastic products, while sectors with small share of imports for processing exports include chemical fertilizers and 
medical products. 
18 The sectors identified with large processing exports include for example electronic and communication equipment 
and household electric appliances, while sectors with small processing exports include chemical pesticides and 




where “cash flow” denotes cash flow from operations plus reductions in inventories plus 
decreases in receivables plus increases in payables.  Conceptually, the Rajan-Zingales (RZ) 
index aims to identify sectors that are naturally more dependent on external financing for their 
investment and other business operations.
19   
Following standard practice, the RZ index is calculated using data for U.S. firms, which 
are assumed to suffer least from financing constraints of a sort likely to disguise their underlying 
reliance on external finance. While the original Rajan and Zingales (1998) paper covers 40 
(mainly SIC 2-digit) sectors, we expand the coverage to 90 SIC 3-digit sectors.  To calculate the 
dependence external financing of U.S. firms, we first sort all firms listed in COMPUSTAT USA 
into SIC 3-digit sectors.  We then calculate the external-finance-dependence ratio (eqn. 4) for 
each firm on average for the period 1990-2006.  Finally we take the sector-level median from 
firm ratios for each SIC 3-digit sector with at least 5 firms as the index of demand for external 
finance by firms in that sector.  To capture the percentage of capital expenditure financed 
externally, we winsorize our version of the RZ index to range from 0 to 1, as in Tong and Wei 
(2011). 
We also add as control variables firm size (log assets in US dollars), and country, date 
and sector fixed effects.   
 Table III provides summary statistics for the dependent variables and explanatory 
variables. Throughout we cluster standard errors by sector. 
 
 
                                                 
19 In so doing it ignores the question of which firms within a sector are more liquidity constrained.  What the RZ 
index measures could be regarded as a technical or technological characteristic of the sector, almost like a part of the 




III. Results for the Two PBOC Announcements  
In this section, we first report results for the trade channel (Tables IV to VI) and financial 
channel (Table VII) separately, before including them both in a single equation (Table VIII). 
   
A.  Exports to China 
Table IV presents benchmark estimates for firms exporting to China.  The first column 
shows that, on average, such firms are expected to benefit from RMB appreciation.  The 
coefficient in question is significantly different from zero at the 10 percent confidence level.   
In addition, however, the constant term is positive and significant at the 1 per cent 
confidence level. This raises the question of whether the observed increase in stock valuations is 
driven by trade-related effects or general market sentiment, where market sentiment might 
improve because expectations of renminbi appreciation reduce fears that the U.S. might brand 
China as a currency manipulator and impose trade sanctions to which China might retaliate.  
Public commentary is consistent with some role for this second factor.
20    
In Column 2 we therefore add (China's Processing Imports )*(Exports to China ) jj k t , as in 
equation (3), including also its components as controls.  Exports to China has a significant 
positive coefficient, confirming that firms selling final products to China are expected to benefit 
from renminbi appreciation.  The interaction term is negative, and its coefficient differs 
                                                 
20 BBC Business (6/21/2010) noted in the wake of the 2010 announcement that Chinese yuan flexibility comments 
buoyed markets, as “the move, ahead of the G20 summit later this month, has tempered market fears of a possible 
trade war between China and the U.S.”  Deutsche Bank Global Market Research (6/21/2010) noted that “the decline 
in the probability of a trade war between China and the US – as a result of China’s currency move -- should help lift 
market sentiment for risky asset classes.”  AFP London (Jun 21, 2010) similarly noted that “Global equities surged 
on Monday after China said it would relax constraints on the yuan, in a surprise move seen by analysts as an attempt 
to defuse tensions before a crucial G20 summit this weekend … Investor sentiment has improved quite dramatically 
over the weekend, with the news that China has pledged to allow its yuan to appreciate, helping to drive all major 




significantly from zero at the 1 per cent confidence level.  Plausibly, the positive impact 
otherwise felt by firms exporting to China is smaller for sectors where China imports products 
for use in the production of processing exports.  
From the point estimates in Column 2, we see that the net effect for firms exporting to 
China in sectors with few processing inputs is large, while the net effect can be small and even 
negative for firms exporting to China in sectors with significant processing inputs. To illustrate, 
consider two firms, both with 20 per cent of their exports going to China. Suppose one firm is in 
the wine sector (where the data suggest that 1.8 per cent of exports to China are used as 
processing inputs
21); its stock price would then increase by 0.51 per cent (we include the constant 
term of 0.25 per cent). This is a large effect compared with the average market return of 0.27 per 
cent estimated to occur in response to these two events. Suppose now that the other firm is from 
the electronic components sector (where 82 per cent of exports to China are used as processing 
inputs).  This firm’s stock return would rise by only 0.16 per cent.  This makes the difference in 
stock returns between the two firms 0.35 percent (0.51%-0.16%).  
Other factors besides firms’ exports to China may of course affect stock returns. We now 
add variables designed to help capture these factors, such as firm size (as measured by the log of 
book assets in US dollars), information on which is from Worldscope.
22   Adding firm size in 
Column 3 actually slightly increases the magnitude of the interaction of China’s Processing 
Imports and Exports to China, with the interaction term remaining significantly different from 
zero at the 1% level.  
In Column 4 we add fixed effects for the announcement day, country, and 3-digit US SIC 
sector.  While the magnitude of the negative effect on China’s Processing Imports * Exports to 
                                                 
21 One wonders: are the bottles being reused? 




China declines slightly (logically insofar as part of its impact is now captured by fixed effects), it 
remains significant at the 5% level.  
While the pattern of stock returns across firms is consistent with the global-production-
chain story, we also consider alternative explanations, such as that countries exporting more to 
China experience faster appreciation of their own currencies.  It is widely argued, for example, 
that neighboring Asian countries trading heavily with China are reluctant to see their currencies 
rise for fear of losing market share there or in their home markets, fears that should be attenuated 
if the renminbi is itself allowed to rise against extra-regional currencies. 
To capture this possibility we add two interaction terms: Local Currency Appreciation * 
Exports to China, and RMB Appreciation*Exports to China.
23  While the preceding logic 
suggests that local currency appreciation is likely to be endogenous with respect to renminbi 
appreciation, the level of the exchange rate is a country-level variable beyond the influence of 
individual firms.  Hence it should still provide some insight into the question at hand.  
In Column 5 of Table IV, RMB Appreciation*Exports to China has a significant positive 
coefficient, while Local Currency Appreciation*Exports to China has a significant negative one.  
Both signs accord with the preceding intuition.  The interaction of China’s Processing Imports 
and Exports to China still has a negative coefficient (-2.37) that is statistically significant at the 
1% level, consistent with earlier results.  In Column 6, we add country, date and sector fixed 
effects.  Local Currency Appreciation * Exports to China is no longer significant, while previous 
results continue to hold for the interaction of China’s Processing Imports with Exports to China.  
                                                 
23 In a sense we have already provided for this possibility by including country fixed effects and year fixed effects. 




Allowing for the asymmetric response of local currencies thus leaves our interpretation in 
terms of global supply chains unaffected. 
In Column 7, we add a dummy variable for whether a sector has an above-median value 
for China’s Processing Imports (i.e, >=0.5) to help to control for measurement error in the index 
of China’s Processing Imports.  We interact this dummy with Exports to China.  Again the 
coefficient on the interaction term is negative and significant at the 1% level.    
In Column 8, we consider focus on electronic components as a case study of processing 
trade.  Electronic components are defined as U.S. SIC Industry Group 367 (Electronic 
Components and Accessories).   Note that the export of laptops alone contributes to about half of 
China's surplus in processing trade.
24  We therefore define a dummy variable to denote firms 
active in these sectors; this takes on a value of one for 7 per cent of the firms in the sample.  
Component sector * Exports to China enters with a negative coefficient in Column 8, consistent 
with the idea that firms exporting components to China are negatively affected by renminbi 
appreciation.   
 
B.  Competition in home market 
         In Table V we consider competition in the firm’s home market as captured by imports 
from China as a share of total imports.  Specifically, we ask how imports from China affect stock 
prices.  In Column 1, the coefficient on this variable is positive and significant at the 10% level.  
It would appear that expectations of renminbi appreciation boost stock prices for firms that 
compete with China in their home markets.   In Column 2 we ask whether the results vary with 
the degree of processing trade in imports from China, adding
                                                 
24 95 percent of laptops worldwide being assembled in China.  See “Processing Industry at Root of Trade 




(China's Processing Exports )*(Imports from China ) jj k t . The hypothesis is that firms importing 
Chinese products that themselves possess high imported-input content are likely to feel negative 
effects insofar as they are parent companies of Chinese subsidiaries or reside upstream of China 
in the relevant production chain.  The index of China’s Processing Exports is from Koopman et 
al (2008), which uses China’s input-output table to calculate the contribution of processing trade 
to final exports for 99 sectors.   
  The coefficient on (China's Processing Exports )*(Imports from China ) jj k t  is negative and 
significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent confidence level, indicating that expectations of 
renminbi appreciation depress stock returns for firms importing products from China with high 
processing content.  In contrast, the coefficient on Imports from China is positive, suggesting 
that international firms competing with China in final-product trade are expected to face less 
competition in their home market.  The point estimate for the interaction term is -1.59, while the 
point estimate for Imports from China is 1.58. Given that the average ratio of China’s Processing 
Exports is 0.38, this means that on average, sectors experience an increase in stock prices as a 
result of expectations operating through this home market channel.  
In Column 3 we again control for firm size. The magnitude of the coefficient on 
j jkt (China's Processing Exports )*(Imports  from China ) increases slightly and remains 
significant at the 5 per cent confidence level.  In Column 4, we add country, year and 3-digit 
sector dummies.  Now the coefficient on the interaction term is somewhat reduced in magnitude 
and becomes insignificant at the traditional confidence level.  
Column 5 controls for local currency appreciation.  RMB appreciation * Imports from 
China has a significant positive coefficient, while Local Currency Appreciation * Imports from 




of Chinese Processing Exports with Imports from China now has a larger magnitude and is 
significant at the 10 per cent confidence level.  
 
C.  Third-market competition 
        Table VI focuses on third-market competition.  The variable capturing this effect enters 
in Column 1 with a positive and significant coefficient, suggesting that firms competing with 
Chinese firms in third markets indeed benefit from renminbi appreciation.  
In Column 2 we add the interaction of Third-market competition with China’s processing 
exports. The new term is negative but insignificant. In Column 3, we include firm size, and 
sector, country, and year fixed effects. The interaction term becomes positive but remains 
insignificant.     
Column 4 controls for local currency appreciation.  RMB appreciation * Third market 
competition now enters with a significant positive coefficient, while Local currency appreciation 
* Third market competition has an insignificant coefficient, consistent with preceding intuition. 
Moreover, the coefficient on the interaction of Chinese processing exports with Third market 
competition is now smaller in magnitude and remains statistically insignificant.    
 
D.  Financial channel 
  In Table VII, we consider the possibility that expectations of renminbi appreciation put 
upward pressure on treasury yields, making it more expensive for financially-dependent firms to 
fund their operations.  U.S. treasury yields in fact rose on both announcement dates, consistent 
with the idea that faster renminbi appreciation would mean fewer PBOC purchases of U.S. 




The question is whether this had a differential impact on more financially dependent 
firms.  As Column 1 shows, financially dependent firms saw their share prices decline with both 
two announcements of prospective changes in China’s exchange rate regime, consistent with the 
hypothesis. The results carry through when we include firm-level control variables, i.e., firm size 
in Column 2, and when we further add country and year fixed effects in Column 3.   
In Column 4, we add the interaction of financial dependence and financial openness 
(measured by the country’s foreign assets and liabilities over GDP, following Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti 2007).  The hypothesis is that countries more integrated with global financial markets 
will be affected more by a rise in treasury yield. We find the interaction term indeed has a 
negative coefficient significant at the 1% level. The results for the financial channel remain the 
same if we add sector fixed effects, as in Column 5.    
 
E.  Combining the trade and financial channels 
So far we have analyzed each transmission channel separately.  In Table VIII we now 
combine the financial channel with three trade channels in a single specification.  Dangers of 
multicolinearity notwithstanding, the previous results carry over.  In Column 1, (China's 
processing imports)* (Exports to China) has a negative coefficient and is significant at the 5% 
level. Similarly, (China's processing exports)*(Imports from China) has a negative coefficient 
that is significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent confidence level.   The coefficient on 
(China's processing exports)*(Third-market competition) remains positive, albeit insignificant.  
And (Dependence on external finance for investment)*(Financial openness) is still significantly 




We add sector fixed effects in Column 2; again, the results carry over. Moreover, the 
coefficient on (China's processing exports)*(Third-market competition) is now significantly 
different from zero at the 5 per cent confidence level. Evidently, expectations of renminbi 
appreciation increase stock returns for firms competing with China in third markets in products 
with high processing content.  The positive sign of the interaction term also suggests that our 
earlier finding of negative coefficient for (China's Processing Exports )*(Imports from China ) j jkt  is 
unlikely to be due to sector-specific features such as  income sensitivity, since these features 
would generate same signs for (China's Processing Exports )*(Imports from China )
jj k t  and 
(China's Processing Exports )*(Third-Market Competition )
jj k t .
25   
 
IV. Robustness Checks 
Abnormal returns have also been used to analyze the impact of macroeconomic shocks 
(by e.g, Mackinlay 1997).  A common model of normal returns assumes a stable linear relation 
between the market return and individual security return: 
 
,, , , , *     it it it it kt Abnormal return = Stock return Alpha Beta Marketreturn  
                (5) 
 
We construct each firm’s beta annually based on the correlation of weekly firm-level 
stock returns and local market returns.
26 We then construct each firm’s alpha as the annual 
                                                 
25 In other words, the opposite signs of  (China's Processing Exports )*(Imports from China )
jj k t and
(China's Processing Exports )*(Third-Market Competition )
jj k t  are more consistent with the global production chain story. 
26 We use the domestic beta rather than a beta based on a world factor model because Griffin (2002) finds that 
domestic factor models perform better in explaining time-series variations in returns and have lower pricing errors 




average of its weekly average return minus the beta multiplied by the annual average market 
return.  We use the one-year-lagged beta and alpha in constructing the abnormal return around 
the two renminbi appreciation dates.
27  We winsorize the dependent variable at the 1 per cent 
level to reduce the influence of outliers.  
The results using abnormal returns are in Tables IX-X for exports to and imports from 
China. They confirm the findings of Tables IV and V.  According to Column 1 of Table IX, 
firms exporting to China experience a decline in their abnormal stock returns around the time of 
the two renminbi appreciation announcements. While this result is not intuitive, it is consistent 
with the findings in Cheung, Chinn and Fujii (2010), where renminbi appreciation reduces 
China’s imports.  In Column 2 we include the interaction of Exports to China with China’s 
Processing Imports. This term also has a negative coefficient that differs significantly from zero 
at the 5 per cent confidence level.  However, the coefficient on Exports to China is no longer 
significant, suggesting that the negative coefficient in Column 1 is driven mainly by firms 
exporting processing inputs to China. In Column 3, where we add firm size and country, year 
and sector fixed effects, the interaction term increases somewhat in size and becomes significant 
at the 1 per cent confidence level.  Column 4 controls for local currency appreciation.  The 
coefficient on RMB appreciation * Exports to China is now insignificantly different from zero, 
while Local Currency appreciation * Exports to China has a significant negative coefficient, 
again consistent with preceding intuition. Reassuringly, the interaction of Exports to China with 
China’s processing imports remains significant at the 1 per cent confidence level. 
                                                 
27 As the alpha is constructed from weekly stock data, we use (1/5)*alpha in constructing the abnormal stock return 




In Table X we consider imports from China in a specification like that in Table V but 
now using abnormal returns as the dependent variable.  In Column 1 Imports from China enters 
negatively but does not differ significantly from zero. In Column 2 we include the interaction of 
Imports from China with China's Processing Exports. This interaction enters negatively, and its 
coefficient differs significantly from zero at the 1% confidence level. It remains significant at the 
1% level when we add firm size, country, year and sector fixed effects (Column 3).  In Column 
4, the interaction term remains significant when we control for local currency appreciation. 
Hence the analysis of abnormal stock returns confirms our earlier findings based on total returns. 
In Table XI, column 1, we combine the trade channels (exports to China, home market 
competition and third-market competition) and financial channel in a single regression for 
abnormal returns. Column 2 then adds sector fixed effects.  The results confirm our earlier 
findings for total returns: (China's processing imports)* (Exports to China) as significantly 
negative, (China's processing exports)*(Imports from China) as significantly negative, (China's 
processing exports)*(Third-market competition) as positive but insignificant, and (Dependence 
on external finance for investment*Financial openness) as significantly negative.  
Finally, we analyzed daily stock returns on 7/19/2005 and 6/17/2010, i.e., two trading 
days before the PBOC announcements, as a placebo test.  We do not find a significant coefficient 
for the trade channels.
28  This reassures us that the stock-market response we detect is not 




                                                 




V. Results for Market-Perceived Policy Changes 
While moving from country- to firm-level data extends the sample along one dimension – 
the number of firms – it does little to expand it along the other – time – dimension, since as of 
the time of writing there have only two official announcements pointing to the prospect of future 
appreciation.    
We address this problem by considering in addition to actual announcements changes in 
market expectations.  We focus on large movements in the price of nondeliverable forward 
(NDF) dollar-renminbi contracts that coincide with newspaper articles about possible changes in 
Chinese exchange rate policy owing to foreign political pressure.  We identify four dates in 
calendar year 2003 when movements in the renminbi NDF rate reacted strongly to political 
pressures, such as G-7 communiqués and speeches by senior U.S. officials.
29  We use media 
coverage from Factiva to check that these NDF movements were not obviously responding to 
other macroeconomic news, such as new information on inflation, central bank policy rates or 
trade balances in China and the U.S.   
Appendix Table 1 lists the four dates.  Daily appreciation of the 12-month renminbi NDF 
rate on these four days ranges from 0.74 per cent to 1.16 per cent, with a mean of 0.90 per cent.
30  
In the case of the two PBOC announcements, by comparison, the daily change in the 12-month 
NDF is 0.37 per cent and 0.98 per cent.  In terms of the magnitude of the exchange rate response, 
then, the two sets of episodes are broadly comparable.    
In Column 1 of Table XII, we examine the impact of renminbi NDF appreciation in these 
four episodes on firm valuations, where we include firm size and country-date pair fixed 
                                                 
29 There were also strong political pressures in year 2010 associated with talk of “currency wars”. But 2010 also saw 
a global financial crisis and many government interventions, which makes it more difficult to identify the effects of 
market-perceived RMB policy changes.    





31  The coefficient on (China's processing imports)* (Exports to China) is negative and 
differs significantly from zero at the 5 per cent confidence level, consistent with our earlier 
results for the two PBOC announcements.  In Column 2, we add sector fixed effects: the 
coefficient on (China's processing imports)* (Exports to China) is now larger and differs 
significantly from zero at the one per cent confidence level. Similarly, the coefficient on (China's 
processing exports)*(Imports from China) is negative and significantly different from zero at the 
10 per cent level.  (China's processing exports)*(Third-market competition) is positive but 
insignificant, and (Dependence on external finance for investment*Financial openness) is 
negative and insignificant.   
On balance, this analysis of market-perceived policy changes confirms our earlier 
findings for the two actual PBOC announcements.  
 
VI. Conclusions 
We have analyzed the impact of prospective appreciation of the renminbi exchange rate 
on the rest of the world using firm-level data.  Using movements in stock prices of some 6,000 
manufacturing firms in 44 economies, we examine the response of share prices to two 
announcements of changes in China’s currency policy in 2005 and 2010 which plausibly created 
expectations of faster renminbi appreciation. We then consider four instances of market-
perceived changes in exchange rate policy, as reflected in unusually large renminbi movements 
on the NDF market, each of which was associated with political as opposed to economic factors.  
Expectations of renminbi appreciation appear to impact foreign firm valuations both 
through a general market-sentiment effect, which plausibly reflects diminished fears of trade 
                                                 




sanctions and retaliation, and a set of trade-related channels.  Renminbi-appreciation 
expectations positively impact firms selling final goods to China; in contrast, such expectations 
do not positively affect the share prices of firms selling inputs to China for use in its processing 
trade; for such firms the effect is if anything negative.  There is some evidence that renminbi 
appreciation positively affects firms competing with China in home and third markets, but the 
effect in home market is weaker for firms in sectors where China’s exports have large imported-
input content.   Finally, there is evidence of a negative impact on financially-dependent firms 
which may find it more costly to fund their operations as a result of the upward pressure on 
yields resulting from reduced Chinese purchases of foreign treasury bonds.   
These patterns remain when we control for firm-specific characteristics and sector, year 
and country fixed effects. They are still evident when we control for local currency movements 
associated with renminbi appreciation. They continue to hold when abnormal rather than total 
stock returns are used as the dependent variable.  Finally, placebo tests for similar effects on 
adjoining days do not find them, suggesting that these stock-price responses are not being caused 
by other events affecting market valuations. 
Overall, the message is that across-the-board inferences are misleading.  The impact of 
renminbi appreciation, actual and prospective, on firms, sectors and countries will be very 
different depending on their circumstances and the specific nature of their interaction with China. 







Country   # of Firms  Country  # of Firms 
Argentina  17  Japan  1,159 
Australia  101  South Korea  538 
Austria  30  Malaysia  228 
Belgium  34  Mexico  20 
Brazil  39  Netherlands  36 
Canada  199  New Zealand  8 
Chile  17  Norway  27 
Colombia  6  Pakistan  40 
Czech Republic  4  Peru  11 
Denmark  35  Philippines  8 
Egypt  21  Poland  56 
Finland  50  Portugal  11 
France  163  Russian Federation  19 
Germany  207  Singapore  117 
Greece  77  South Africa  32 
Hong Kong, SAR  142  Spain  34 
Hungary  8  Sweden  74 
India  529  Switzerland  82 
Indonesia  47  Thailand  118 
Ireland  10  Turkey  79 
Israel  35  United Kingdom  194 


















Argentina ‐ 0.53  0.03  0.40  0.06 
Australia  0.64  1.16  1.31  0.40 
Austria ‐ 0.57  0.10  0.85 ‐ 0.64 
Belgium  0.61  0.10  0.79 ‐ 0.64 
Brazil  1.10  0.50  0.81  0.55 
Canada ‐ 0.15  0.33  0.13 ‐ 0.29 
Chile  0.43 ‐ 0.31 ‐ 0.15 ‐ 0.45 
China  0.86  1.98  3.62  0.44 
Colombia  1.75  0.83 ‐ 0.45 ‐ 0.20 
Czech Republic ‐ 0.40  0.04  1.05 ‐ 0.71 
Denmark ‐ 0.05  0.09  0.97 ‐ 0.68 
Egypt ‐ 0.38 ‐ 0.02  2.35  0.11 
Finland ‐ 5.78  0.10  0.22 ‐ 0.64 
France  0.09  0.10  1.25 ‐ 0.64 
Germany  0.83  0.10  1.27 ‐ 0.64 
Greece  0.54  0.10  3.39 ‐ 0.64 
Hong Kong SAR  1.26  0.14  2.59  0.16 
Hungary ‐ 0.28  0.08  3.12 ‐ 0.66 
India  1.46  0.97  1.77  0.79 
Indonesia  1.89  0.50  0.39  0.84 
Ireland  0.94  0.10  0.27 ‐ 0.64 
Israel  0.00  0.76  0.92  0.00 
Italy  0.02  0.10  0.27 ‐ 0.64 
Japan ‐ 0.64  2.22  2.07 ‐ 0.34 
Korea (South) ‐ 0.55  0.82  1.64  2.48 
Malaysia  1.86  0.00  1.23  2.03 
Mexico ‐ 0.50  0.11  0.14  0.09 
Netherlands  0.06  0.10  1.16 ‐ 0.64 
New Zealand  0.38  1.08  1.32  0.03 
Norway  0.21  0.32  1.67 ‐ 1.03 
Pakistan ‐ 0.48  0.05  0.52  0.04 
Peru  0.27  0.00  1.07 ‐ 0.67 
Philippines ‐ 0.66  0.09  0.82  0.67 
Poland ‐ 0.96  0.56  1.39 ‐ 1.03 
Portugal  0.20  0.10  0.73 ‐ 0.64 
Russian Federation ‐ 0.64  0.35  2.66  0.40 
Singapore  0.48  2.12  1.77  0.58 
South Africa ‐ 0.25  0.36  0.44 ‐ 0.07 
Spain  0.22  0.10  0.87 ‐ 0.64 
Sweden  1.29  0.26  0.53 ‐ 0.39 
Switzerland ‐ 0.26 ‐ 0.04  1.10 ‐ 0.36 
Thailand  0.00  2.09  2.41  0.37 
Turkey  0.95  0.47  0.56 ‐ 0.18 
United Kingdom  0.12  0.70  0.90 ‐ 0.53 
United States ‐ 0.69  0.00 ‐ 0.39  0.00 






Variables  Obs  Mean  St Dev  Median  p25  p75  Min  Max 
              
Firm‐year level              
Stock Return  12432  0.27  3.02  0.00 ‐ 0.77  1.27 ‐ 25.48  30.98 
Firm size  12432  12.24  2.08  12.15  10.97  13.51  6.25  17.32 
                
Country‐sector ‐year level              
Exports to China  5211  0.05  0.10  0.01  0.00  0.06  0.00  0.44 
Imports from China  5211  0.12  0.18  0.04  0.00  0.17  0.00  0.83 
Third‐market competition  5211  0.07  0.09  0.04  0.01  0.10  0.00  0.50 
                
US SIC 3‐digit sector level              
China's Processing Imports  100  0.43  0.26  0.48  0.16  0.63  0.02  0.85 
China's Processing Exports  99  0.37  0.25  0.40  0.20  0.51  0.00  0.99 


















   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Exports to China  0.41*  1.32*** 1.32*** 0.29 ‐ 0.22 ‐ 1.89*** ‐2.10*** ‐2.54***
[0.23]  [0.27]  [0.26]  [0.53]  [0.43]  [0.66]  [0.58]  [0.53] 
China's processing imports*Exports to China ‐ 1.98*** ‐2.17*** ‐1.57** ‐2.37*** ‐1.91***
[0.64]  [0.62]  [0.72]  [0.65]  [0.73] 
China's processing imports ‐ 0.031  0.074  0.076 
[0.30]  [0.28]  [0.27] 
Firm‐Size  0.100***0.064***0.081*** 0.068***0.068***0.068***
[0.020]  [0.017]  [0.022]  [0.017]  [0.017]  [0.017] 
RMB appreciation*Exports to China  3.94***  4.43*** 4.37*** 4.34***
[0.77]  [0.67]  [0.66]  [0.66] 
Local currency appreciation*Exports to China ‐ 1.29*** ‐ 0.32 ‐ 0.35 ‐ 0.35 
[0.24]  [0.27]  [0.26]  [0.26] 
RMB appreciation  0.77*** 
[0.26] 
Local currency appreciation  0.14*** ‐ 0.25*** ‐0.25*** ‐0.25***





Constant  0.23***  0.25 ‐ 1.00*** ‐1.36*** 
[0.072]  [0.15]  [0.32]  [0.30] 
Country fixed effects  N  N  N  Y  N  Y  Y  Y 
Year fixed effects  N  N  N  Y  N  Y  Y  Y 
Sector fixed effects  N  N  N  Y  N  Y  Y  Y 
Observations  12,432  12,432 12,432  12,432  12,432  12,432  12,432  12,432 





















   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Imports from China  0.49*  1.58***  1.59***  0.69* ‐ 0.79 
[0.28]  [0.48]  [0.46]  [0.35]  [0.66] 
China's processing exports*Imports from China ‐ 1.59** ‐ 1.67** ‐ 0.72 ‐ 0.85* 
[0.75]  [0.73]  [0.48]  [0.50] 
China's processing exports ‐ 0.29 ‐ 0.20 
[0.26]  [0.26] 








Constant  0.20**  0.28* ‐ 0.90*** 
[0.079]  [0.14]  [0.32] 
Country fixed effects  N  N  N  Y  Y 
Year fixed effects  N  N  N  Y  Y 
Sector fixed effects  N  N  N  Y  Y 
Observations  12,432  12,318  12,318  12,318  12,318 



















   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
              
Third‐market competition  1.52***  2.41** ‐ 0.40 ‐ 4.64***
[0.56]  [1.10]  [0.78]  [1.56] 














Country fixed effects  N  N  Y  Y 
Year fixed effects  N  N  Y  Y 
Sector fixed effects  N  N  Y  Y 
Observations  12,432  12,318  12,318  12,318 
















Table VII. Impact of PBOC announcements on stock returns: 
Controlling for financial channel 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
                 
Dependence on external finance for investment   ‐0.15*** ‐0.13*** ‐0.082*** ‐0.047***
  [0.017]  [0.014]  [0.012]  [0.015] 
Firm‐Size  0.090*** 0.062***  0.061*** 0.061***







Country fixed effects  N  N  Y  Y  Y 
Year fixed effects  N  N  Y  Y  Y 
Sector fixed effects  N  N  N  N  Y 
Observations  12,005  12,005  12,005  12,005  12,005 



























































   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
              
Exports to China ‐ 0.59***  0.20  0.21  0.58 
[0.20]  [0.35]  [0.49]  [0.76] 














Country fixed effects  N  N  Y  Y 
Year fixed effects  N  N  Y  Y 
Sector fixed effects  N  N  Y  Y 
Observations  12,350  12,350  12,350  12,350 


















   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
              
Imports from China ‐ 0.12  1.26*** 0.93**  0.67 















Country fixed effects  N  N  Y  Y 
Year fixed effects  N  N  Y  Y 
Sector fixed effects  N  N  Y  Y 
Observations  9,939  9,839  9,839  9,839 




































































  [0.45]  [0.48] 
China's processing imports*Exports to China   ‐2.07** ‐ 2.56*** 










  [0.62]  [0.66] 
China's processing exports* Third‐market competition  0.18  0.63 






  [0.088]  [0.090] 
Firm‐Size  0.017  0.017 
















Figure 1. Correlation of stock market return (vertical axis) and trade exposure to China 
(horizontal axis) around the time of two PBOC announcements 
Exports exposure to China, measured by exports to China 
over total exports, for PBOC announcement in 2005.  
 
Exports exposure to China, measured by exports to China 





imports from China, as measured by imports from China 
over total imports, for PBOC announcement in 2005. 
 
 
imports from China, as measured by imports from China 
over total imports, for PBOC announcement in 2010 . 
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“Speculation  of  a  Chinese  yuan  revaluation  pushed  offshore  dollar‐yuan  nondeliverable 
forward discounts to new records Tuesday…The NDF market experienced one of its most 
volatile sessions after a weekend statement by the Group of Seven leading industrial nations 
called for flexible exchange rates.” 
Source: “China Yuan Ends Higher; NDF Discounts At New Records”, Dow Jones International 
News, September 23, 2003. 
 
Oct 3, 2003  0.96 
“The one‐year Chinese yuan non‐delivery forwards (NDF) jumped to a new one‐year highs 
after the US Treasury Secretary John Snow told lawmakers that he hopes to see China move 
to a more flexible exchange rate.” 
Source: “News Briefs ‐ The one‐year Chinese yuan non‐delivery forwards (NDF) jumped to a 
new one‐year highs”, Taiwan Business News, October 4, 2003. 